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1205 
Four Free Speech Goals for  
Trademark Law 
William McGeveran* 
Trademarks constrain the use of language.  Some disputes 
about trademarks thus involve serious arguments about the 
defendant’s right to engage in free speech.  The case that serves as 
the impetus for this panel, Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey,1 is an 
especially shocking example of a district court enjoining 
substantive noncommercial speech in the name of preserving the 
value of a trademark.  It was so shocking that protests and amicus 
briefs poured in from bloggers, law professors, and advocacy 
groups of every stripe, including Eugene Volokh, Mark Lemley, 
Larry Lessig, David Post, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and 
many others.2  It was so shocking that the appeals court promptly 
 
A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/ 
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2818.  Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete 
Journal archive. 
* Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School.  I have received helpful 
comments about this project from many people, especially Barton Beebe, Dan Burk, Tom 
Cotter, Stacey Dogan, Eric Goldman, Laura Heymann, Mark McKenna, and participants 
in the Fifth Annual Works in Progress in Intellectual Property Colloquium at Washington 
College of Law, American University.  I also benefited from the questions and insights of 
participants at this symposium, particularly my fellow panelists Sonia Katyal, Brett 
Frischmann, and Robert Weisbein.  I am grateful for research assistance from L. Ashley 
Aull and David Biggs.  Some early research on these issues was conducted as part of a 
fellowship at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School. 
 1 Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’g Freecycle 
Network, Inc. v. Oey, No. CV 06-173, Preliminary Injunction Order (D. Ariz. May 11, 
2006). 
 2 See Brief for 38 Intell. Prop. Professors and the Elec. Frontier Found. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Freecycle, 505 F.3d 898 (No. 06-16219), available at 
http://www.volokh.com/files/freecyclelemleybrief.pdf; Brief of James Boyle et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Freecycle, 505 F.3d 898 (No. 06-16219), available 
at http://www.volokh.com/files/freecyclepostbrief.pdf; Posting of Eugene Volokh to The 
Volokh Conspiracy, http://www.volokh.com/posts/chain_1190828574.shtml (July 14, 
2006, 18:03 EST). 
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reversed the injunction and concluded that the plaintiff had 
completely failed to show the required likelihood of success on the 
merits.3  It was shocking, and so the Freecycle case became a 
cause célèbre—not because it was typical, but because it was 
unusual. 
There is no shortage of law review articles and books warning 
that overly broad interpretations of trademark rights imperil free 
speech values.4  I share their sense of concern, yet the eventual 
decisions in almost all recent controversial cases protected speech,5 
just as the Ninth Circuit did in Freecycle.  When courts finally 
reach the merits, these cases suggest, the defendant’s free speech 
arguments ultimately carry the day.6  This does not mean that all is 
well.  It does mean, however, that we need to focus on the true free 
speech problem in trademark law. 
That problem arises because only a tiny fraction of disputes 
actually reach litigation and become eligible for a happy ending 
like the one we saw in the Freecycle case.  Moreover, their 
holdings tend to be tied closely to their facts and so offer limited 
value as precedent.  Considerable anecdotal evidence suggests that 
the real action occurs outside the courthouse: markholders send 
cease-and-desist letters and threaten legal action against those 
using trademarks to facilitate speech, and the recipients frequently 
 
 3 Freecycle, 505 F.3d at 906 & n.15. 
 4 See, e.g., DAVID BOLLIER, BRAND NAME BULLIES: THE QUEST TO OWN AND CONTROL 
CULTURE (2005); KEMBREW MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION®: OVERZEALOUS 
COPYRIGHT BOZOS AND OTHER ENEMIES OF CREATIVITY (2005); Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397 (1990); Alex Kozinski, Essay, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 960 (1993); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of 
Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687 (1999); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The 
Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717 (1999). 
 5 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods. (Mattel-Walking Mountain), 353 
F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 6 See, e.g., id.; BidZirk, L.L.C. v. Smith, No. 6:06-109-HMH, 2007 WL 3119445 
(D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2007); see also Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 
27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187 (2004); Sarah Mazzie-Briscoe, Free Speech v. Trademark 
Rights: Has the Weather Changed? (March 19, 2006), http://www.chillingeffects.org/ 
weather.cgi?WeatherID=540 (noting a possible trend of improvement in courts’ 
deference to free speech concerns in cybersquatting cases). 
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capitulate.7  We need not devote too much energy to improving the 
courts’ ability to reach the correct substantive outcomes in the final 
judgment at the end of a lawsuit.  They already do.  Rather, the 
priority should be restructuring the relevant doctrines to reduce the 
pre-litigation chilling effect.  My objective here is to discuss four 
normative goals to guide those doctrinal improvements (Part I), 
and to make some extremely preliminary suggestions about what 
the relevant parts of trademark law might look like as a result (Part 
II). 
I. 
A. Balance Between Economic and Expressive Values 
The first normative objective, when stated simply, encapsulates 
the whole problem of using trademarks to engage in speech: the 
doctrine must balance interests in source identification and in 
unfettered expression.  This search for equilibrium has been part of 
trademark jurisprudence since its earliest days.8  Despite other 
shortcomings, existing doctrine eventually strikes this balance 
most of the time. 
We all understand the economic function of trademarks as 
important shorthand to help consumers identify with accuracy the 
products they want to buy.9  So, for example, my young daughter 
 
 7 James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 
YALE L.J. 882, 913 (2007); MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUSTICE, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE? FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL 
35–36 (2005), available at http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/ 
WillFairUseSurvive.pdf; see Chilling Effects Clearinghouse: Search the Database, 
http://www.chillingeffects.org/search.cgi (last visited Feb. 26, 2008) (database with 
examples of legal threats against trademark holders); Citizen Media Law Project Legal 
Threats Database, http://www.citmedialaw.org/database (last visited Feb. 26, 2008) 
(same). 
 8 See, e.g., Am. Waltham Watch Co. v. United States Watch Co., 53 N.E. 141, 142 
(Mass. 1899) (Holmes, J.) (“The two desiderata cannot both be had to their full extent, 
and we have to fix the boundaries as best we can.”). 
 9 See generally Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 
(1995); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs 
on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 786–88 (2005) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, 
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and I both prefer SKIPPY creamy peanut butter to others.10  As I 
hurry through the supermarket I know that, if I grab the jar of 
peanut butter with a turquoise cap and the SKIPPY brand name in 
a red paintbrush font, we will both be satisfied with our 
sandwiches.  If an interloper could use a similar name and 
packaging to trick me into buying some competing inferior peanut 
butter, several undesirable results would occur.  For one, my 
daughter might not eat her lunch.11  As a result, my family might 
erroneously discard our preference for SKIPPY in the future 
(unless I later realized I’d been duped).  The maker of SKIPPY12 
would lose my patronage through no fault of its own.  The 
imposter would get my money unjustly through subterfuge.  And 
finally, if this sort of misappropriation of customers happened 
routinely, a producer might find it no longer worthwhile even to 
attempt to preserve the consistent creamy goodness of the product.  
After all, customers who discover they like a product cannot 
reliably find it again without trademarks.  These are all serious 
economic problems that must not be dismissed or trivialized. 
The speech interest on the other pan of the scale is also 
familiar.  Expansive trademark protection for common words and 
phrases can effectively remove them from our language, at least in 
certain contexts.  This has significant anticompetitive effects.13  
 
Search Costs]; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268–70 (1987). 
 10 Perhaps I am projecting; she is only four years old.  But it seems that our peanut 
butter tastes coincide, at least for now. 
 11 Or at least she may ask me repeatedly how many bites of the sandwich are necessary. 
 12 The maker of SKIPPY, as it happens, is a corporation called CPC International that 
has attempted to use trademark law to silence critical commentary on a website. See CPC 
Int’l, Inc. v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456, 458 (4th Cir. 2000).  But I don’t actually need to 
know anything about CPC International, even its name, provided I know that this jar of 
SKIPPY will resemble the others I have enjoyed in the past. See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 
164; 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 3:9 (4th ed. 2007) (“‘source’ identified by a trademark need not be known by name to 
the buyer”) [hereinafter MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS].  Thus it is somewhat imprecise to 
say that trademarks are source identifiers, and it might be better to call them indicators of 
products’ resemblance or consistency.  The “source identification” terminology is well-
established despite its imprecision, however, and I use it here. 
 13 See Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1430 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(Easterbrook, J.) (“If descriptive words and pictures could be appropriated without 
evidence of a secondary meaning, sellers could snatch for themselves the riches of the 
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Beyond the economic impact, doctrines that permit monopolization 
of everyday language may also impoverish artistic, political, and 
social speech.  “Much useful social and commercial discourse 
would be all but impossible if speakers were under threat of an 
infringement lawsuit every time they made reference to a person, 
company or product by using its trademark.”14  Trademarks 
constrain expression most seriously of all when they allow their 
holders to prevent or control discussion about themselves or their 
product.15 
The key here is balance.  Source identification is important, 
and an overly expansive doctrine that immunizes harmfully 
misleading speech might disserve the public.  This can be true even 
in areas with great free speech sensitivity.  I like to use the facts of 
a little-known Massachusetts case to make this point: one month 
after a Planned Parenthood abortion clinic opened, a local pro-life 
group called “Problem Pregnancy” rented an office that was down 
the hall and closer to the elevators, so women intending to go to 
the clinic had to pass by.16  The pro-life group then posted signs on 
the door reading “PP” and “Free pregnancy testing and counseling, 
walk in.”17  Several women did.18  Or, to take an example from the 
other end of the political spectrum, how about the case where the 
Democrats in a local election wanted to rename themselves the 
“Representation for Every Person Party” (or, by its initials, the 
“REP Party”)?19  These examples involve political speech—often 
 
language and make it more difficult for new entrants to identify their own products; 
consumers would be worse off.”). 
 14 New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 15 See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(discussing the risk that “a corporation could shield itself from criticism by forbidding the 
use of its name in commentaries critical of its conduct”). 
 16 Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Problem Pregnancy of Worcester, Inc., 
498 N.E.2d 1044, 1045 (Mass. 1986). 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Tomei v. Finley, 512 F. Supp. 695, 696–97 (N.D. Ill. 1981); see also United We 
Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(enjoining New York chapter of Ross Perot’s political organization, UNITED WE 
STAND AMERICA, which split off from the parent group, from operating and raising 
funds under the UNITED WE STAND name). 
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the sacrosanct category—but even here confusion might become 
too great to be tolerated. 
On the other hand, as the Supreme Court recently ruled, 
sometimes we should tolerate a certain degree of potential 
confusion in order to accommodate concerns about expression.20  
The existence of confusion answers a factual question, but not the 
normative question of whether eliminating that confusion is more 
important than any other values.21  Indeed, no one seems troubled 
if the use of a functional source-indicator by two producers causes 
some confusion among consumers.  We have already balanced 
competing values in those situations, and have structured doctrine 
such that neither producer may claim a trademark monopoly.  The 
same type of balancing should occur when trademarks unduly 
impinge on free expression. 
The normal operation of trademark law typically conceals the 
balancing between these two vital interests.  The issue just doesn’t 
come up in the paradigmatic trademark dispute.  Doctrines such as 
functionality, genericide, the lack of protection for merely 
descriptive marks, and others help ensure that source-identification 
and the public domain happily co-exist.22  In theory, when it comes 
time to decide whether there is a likelihood of consumer confusion 
and thus liability, these threshold requirements have already 
eliminated many of the purported marks that intrude too much on 
the public domain.  In reality, the expansion of trademark rights in 
recent years undermined these initial screening mechanisms.  But 
when cases do slip through those nets, courts ultimately conduct 
 
 20 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc. (KP Permanent I), 543 
U.S. 111, 121–22 (2004) (noting “[t]he common law’s tolerance of a certain degree of 
confusion on the part of consumers” in light of the “undesirability of allowing anyone to 
obtain a complete monopoly on use of a descriptive term simply by grabbing it first”). 
 21 Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 481 (1999) 
(“[T]he issue of whether confusion should be actionable turns not merely on a factual 
analysis of whether confusion exists, but on a policy determination that the type of 
confusion present warrants legal intervention.  Too often courts simply plug the facts of a 
case into their version of the Polaroid factor test and pretend that the result is necessarily 
a sensible one.”). 
 22 See Rebecca Tushnet, Why the Customer Isn’t Always Right: Producer-Based Limits 
on Rights Accretion in Trademark, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 352 (2007), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/2007/04/25/tushnet.html (“Numerous trademark doctrines serve 
to cabin the ability of trademark owners to claim licensing rights.”). 
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the balancing later on by applying various doctrines, including the 
core likelihood of confusion test as well as special standards such 
as the nominative use analysis23 or one of several types of defenses 
based on the First Amendment.24  Occasionally, courts find a 
defendant’s speech-related uses of a mark so confusing that 
trademark limitations ought to apply, although most final decisions 
favor the defendant.  Whatever the outcome, the balancing does 
occur—eventually. 
B. Integration of First Amendment Requirements 
Traditionally, trademark infringement rulings did not violate 
the First Amendment because misleading or deceptive commercial 
speech receives no constitutional protection.25  The courts 
currently define “commercial speech,” as speech that “does no 
more than propose a commercial transaction” in a manner 
“removed from any exposition of ideas.”26  Many uses of 
trademarks in today’s culture go far beyond the boundaries of such 
purely commercial speech.27  They can involve political 
expression,28 artistic works,29 parodies,30 or criticism31.  These 
situations generate much more significant constitutional concerns. 
 
 23 See, e.g., Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 228 (3d 
Cir. 2005); Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2002); New Kids 
on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc, 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 24 See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 927 (6th Cir. 2003); Mattel, 
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. (Mattel-MCA), 296 F.3d 894, 901–02 (9th Cir. 2002); Hormel 
Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prod’ns, Inc., 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. 
Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 
875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st 
Cir. 1987). 
 25 See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15 
(1979); Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the 
Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 165–
66 (1982). 
 26 Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 
(1976) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 27 See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 4, at 400. 
 28 See, e.g., MasterCard Int’l, Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1046, 2004 WL 434404 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004); Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 
266 F. Supp. 2d 682 (N.D. Ohio 2002); Brach Van Houten Holding, Inc. v. Save Brach’s 
Coal. for Chicago, 856 F. Supp. 472 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Stop the Olympic Prison v. U.S. 
Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
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This does not mean, however, that we should invite First 
Amendment balancing into the workaday functioning of trademark 
cases.  Judge Pierre Leval has argued forcefully and correctly for 
the “internalization” of First Amendment requirements within the 
structures of trademark law.32  The general precept that judges 
should avoid unnecessary constitutional decision-making has 
achieved nearly axiomatic status in our legal system.33  The 
problems associated with unnecessary constitutional decisions are 
well-known.  They freeze the development of law—particularly 
regrettable in the setting of the Lanham Act, which relies on 
incremental judicial interpretation of flexible common-law 
standards.  They end the dialogue between the judiciary and the 
legislature because Congress cannot amend the statute in response 
to rulings it disfavors.34  And there is no reason to believe that 
whatever precedents emerge from a constitutional analysis will 
function any better than those fashioned as common law in 
response to underlying policy concerns.35 
 
 29 See, e.g., E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012 
(C.D. Cal. 2006), appeal docketed, No. 06-56237 (Sept. 8, 2006); Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. 
DC Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New 
Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Minn. 1998). 
 30 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods. (Mattel-Walking Mountain), 353 
F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. (Mattel-MCA), 296 F.3d 894 
(9th Cir. 2002); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, 886 F.2d 490 
(2d Cir. 1989); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 31 See, e.g., Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2007); CPC Int’l, 
Inc. v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456 (4th Cir. 2000); BidZirk, L.L.C. v. Smith, No. 6:06-
109-HMH, 2007 WL 3119445 (D.S.C. 2007). 
 32 Leval, supra note 6, at 188–89. 
 33 See Lowe v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 472 U.S. 181, 204–05 & n.50 (1985) 
(interpreting Investment Advisors Act to avoid conflict with First Amendment). 
 34 Congress has shown no reluctance to do so in the sphere of trademark law. See, e.g., 
Trademark Dilution Revision Act, Pub. L. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006) (reversing 
result in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (holding that federal 
trademark law requires actual dilution, which Victoria’s Secret failed to prove)); Barton 
Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1154–55 (2006) (describing Trademark Dilution Revision 
Act as response to Moseley and a product of cooperation among Congress, bar 
associations, academics, and civil society organizations). 
 35 See Leval, supra note 6, at 209. 
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Like other statutes, trademark laws should be interpreted to 
avoid any collisions with constitutional doctrine.36  This 
internalization has happened in other doctrines like genericism and 
functionality, as discussed earlier.37  A trademark fair use doctrine 
that similarly internalizes the requirements of the First Amendment 
can protect speech without the negative effects of excessive 
constitutionalization.38  Courts that followed such a rule would 
have no legitimate need to look beyond it for a constitutionally 
acceptable outcome.  This is one of the successes of the copyright 
fair use defense.39  The First Amendment only appears in those 
cases as a rhetorical flourish, because the balance between the 
copyright monopoly and free speech is woven into the fabric of the 
Copyright Act already through, among other things, its fair use 
doctrine.40 
As Judge Leval laments, in the absence of such internalized 
free speech principles, many cases involving trademarks and free 
expression turn instead to free-form quasi-constitutional balancing, 
without much guidance from either trademark law or First 
Amendment precedents.41  These cases generally end with well-
balanced results, but only on the basis of poorly-articulated 
constitutional justifications.42  Trademark doctrine, like copyright 
 
 36 See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003) 
(avoiding interpretation of Lanham Act that would suggest Congress had 
unconstitutionally “created a species of perpetual patent and copyright”); Universal 
Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 425 (1st Cir. 2007) (“anti-dilution 
laws should be interpreted to provide breathing room for First Amendment concerns”); 
Leval, supra note 6, at 202–08 (reviewing trademark cases based on how well they avoid 
needless constitutional rulings). 
 37 See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text. 
 38 Contra Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the Border Between Trademarks and Free 
Speech: Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive Works, 80 WASH. L. 
REV. 887, 919–20 (2005) (criticizing courts that “have resorted to the fair use doctrine to 
protect First Amendment interests” rather than applying a direct constitutional analysis). 
 39 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 40 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–21 (2003) (“[C]opyright law contains 
built-in First Amendment accommodations.”). 
 41 Leval, supra note 6, at 202–04, 210. 
 42 See, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prod’ns, Inc., 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 
1996); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 
1989); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987); E.S.S. 
Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (C.D. Cal. 2006), 
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doctrine, should function in harmony with First Amendment 
requirements and avoid ad hoc constitutional determinations. 
C. Predictability and Clarity 
From the perspective of an accused infringer who has used a 
trademark merely for purposes of aiding expression, these first two 
goals are high-minded principles of little direct salience.  The 
would-be defendant’s immediate concern is finding out how to 
avoid liability cleanly and efficiently.  A doctrine that is malleable 
and unclear, or that requires lengthy litigation for resolution, will 
exacerbate rather than ameliorate the chilling effect; it either 
discourages legitimate expression with trademarks to begin with, 
or it compels the defendant to withdraw speech when threatened 
with suit.  The next two free speech goals address these more 
concrete problems.  They are both areas where existing doctrine 
fails miserably. 
If you have ever tried to counsel a client who wishes to use a 
trademark for expression then you have confronted the deeply 
muddled state of the law governing such uses.  There are many 
routes to a final adjudication, but none is clear and it is difficult to 
know in advance which ones a court might employ.  I’d even 
speculate that the tangled nature of the doctrine may discourage 
attorneys from offering pro bono help that might otherwise be 
available to some of the artists and parodists who most need 
advice. 
Most obviously, the defendant may try to defeat the prima facie 
case of likelihood of confusion.  Judge Leval, for one, suggests that 
the likelihood of confusion test offers as much protection as 
necessary for free speech.43  There are several problems with 
reliance on likelihood of confusion alone.  First, this analysis is 
notoriously murky and pliable even in typical trademark cases;44 it 
may be impossible to anticipate in advance how confusing a judge 
 
appeal docketed, No. 06-56237 (Sept. 8, 2006); Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc., 
112 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 43 Leval, supra note 6, at 188–89, 202–04. 
 44 See Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 761–64 
(2004); Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark 
Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1583–84 (2006). 
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will find your client’s parody of, or allusion to, a trademark.  Also, 
the test was designed for other situations entirely and a number of 
key factors have little bearing on the comparison between a 
commercially valuable trademark and a speech-focused use of that 
mark.45  Finally, as I state above, we sometimes need to tolerate 
some confusion for the sake of speech.46 
A defendant who has used a trademark for speech purposes 
may try instead to invoke a number of defenses on that basis.  
Those I have in mind are distinct from threshold definitional 
hurdles like genericism and functionality, or from arguments that 
the allegedly infringing use did not satisfy a requirement limiting 
liability to using the mark “as a mark.”47  My list would include: 
• The “descriptive use” defense under § 33(b)(4) of the 
Lanham Act;48 
• The “nominative use” doctrine originated by Judge 
Alex Kozinski in New Kids on the Block v. News 
America Publishing, Inc;49 
• A defense for truthful comparative advertising;50 and 
 
 45 See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 224–25 (3d Cir. 
2005); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 46 See supra notes 13–19 and accompanying text.  The relatively few final judicial 
decisions in the last 15 years or so that clearly overprotected trademarks at the expense of 
speech often did so because of excessive deference to the confusion-prevention purposes 
of trademarks. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 773 (8th 
Cir. 1994) (finding infringement because the parody of a MICHELOB beer advertisement 
might have confused the “superficial observer”). 
 47 There is now an ongoing argument among trademark scholars concerning the 
existence and importance of such a requirement in trademark law. Compare, e.g., 
Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of ‘Trademark Use,’ 39 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 371 (2006); Dogan & Lemley, Search Costs, supra note 9; Stacey L. 
Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 
IOWA L. REV. 1669 (2007) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law], 
with Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in 
Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597 (2007); Mark McKenna, Trademark Use and the 
Problem of Source in Trademark Law (Jan. 18, 2008) (unpublished draft, on file with 
author).  I find persuasive McKenna’s argument that any such requirement ultimately 
collapses into a different articulation of likelihood of confusion, but this complex issue is 
beyond the scope of my more modest discussion here. 
 48 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000). 
 49 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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• Several different flavors of “First Amendment” 
defenses, particularly those emerging from the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Rogers v. Grimaldi.51 
This tangle of doctrines suffers from many problems of clarity.  
First, the boundaries between the various doctrines blur.  Second, 
the requirements of each are vague and courts often apply them 
inconsistently, both within and between different jurisdictions 
(either different states or different circuits in the federal court 
system).  Third, different jurisdictions adopt different 
combinations of doctrines. 
The first of these problems, blur between the doctrines, is 
evident from terminology alone.  All five doctrines are sometimes 
referred to as “fair use,” which is borrowed from the rather 
dissimilar fair use defense codified in copyright law.52  Yet none of 
them has the same scope or flexibility of the copyright fair use 
doctrine.  Beyond the name they use, different courts and 
commentators mix and match these doctrines somewhat 
haphazardly.  Professor McCarthy, in his influential treatise, 
presents comparative advertising as one form of nominative use 
and insists in turn that nominative use should not be an affirmative 
defense at all, but only a different heuristic for analyzing 
likelihood of confusion.53  He discusses all those doctrines as part 
of likelihood of confusion, but takes up each of the others from my 
list in entirely different chapters, and even volumes, of his work.54  
 
 50 See, e.g., Societe Comptoir de L’Industrie Cotonniere Etablissements Boussac v. 
Alexander’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1962). 
 51 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 52 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 53 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, §§ 23:62, 23:63, 23:69; see also Chad J. Doellinger, 
Nominative Fair Use: Jardine and the Demise of a Doctrine, 1 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 5, ¶ 9 (2003), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/njtip/v1/n1/5 
(“[N]ominative fair use should be nothing more than a term used to describe a peculiar 
fact pattern that, given the specific facts of the case, does not lead to a likelihood of 
confusion.”).  As McCarthy acknowledges, the circuits split on this point. Compare 
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 228 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(adopting nominative use as an affirmative defense), with Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 
292 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that nominative use is a substitute test for 
likelihood of confusion). 
 54 See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at §§ 11:45 et seq. (§ 33(b)(4) “fair use” defense); 
4 id. at §§ 24:124 et seq. (“fair use” statutory defenses to trademark dilution); 6 id. at 
§§ 31:139 et seq. (“free speech defense”). 
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Another leading treatise sprinkles these defenses among others 
such as statutes of limitations, and while at one point it calls 
nominative fair use “a judge-made variation on the statutory fair 
use doctrine,” elsewhere it warns that the two are completely 
distinct.55  In their casebook, Professors Dinwoodie and Janis 
group everything on my list (and others) in a chapter about 
“permissible uses of another’s trademarks.”56  A well-known 
deskbook groups them in a similar way, but then, like McCarthy’s 
treatise, describes all of them as variants of likelihood of confusion 
analysis.57  Courts are no more clear.  Many bounce back and forth 
between the quite distinct precedents on § 33(b)(4) and nominative 
fair use, unaware of the resulting inconsistencies.58  This may not 
be surprising, because even the most conscientious courts find the 
distinction between § 33(b)(4) and nominative use difficult to 
apply.59  Meanwhile, other judges simply devise their own 
imprecise variations on “fair use.”60 
Because it is so difficult to predict in advance which doctrines 
may come into play and how they will work, those contemplating 
use of a trademark in speech (or lawyers advising them) must 
consider potential liability under all possible scenarios.  Similarly, 
a party actually sued over an expressive trademark use must 
engage in defensive kitchen-sink pleading and briefing, relying on 
 
 55 3-11 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS §§ 11.08[3][d], 11.08[3][k] 
(2007). 
 56 GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION: 
LAW AND POLICY 663–742 (2d ed. 2007). 
 57 1-8 BEVERLY W. PATTISHALL ET AL., TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
DESKBOOK § 8.06 (2007); see id. at § 8.06[1] (“The salient principle governing the legal 
propriety of using another’s trademark is simply that of truthfulness and the absence of 
any likelihood of deception.”); see also BEVERLY W. PATTISHALL ET AL., TRADEMARKS 
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 335, 335–57 (5th ed. 2002) (same). 
 58 See, e.g., Ultimate Creations, Inc. v. THQ, Inc., No. CV-05-1134-PHX-SMM, 2008 
WL 215827, at *4 (D. Ariz. Jan. 24, 2008). 
 59 See Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 905 (9th Cir. 2003) (lamenting 
that the “distinction often proves more frustrating than helpful”); see also Mattel, Inc. v. 
Walking Mountain Prods. (Mattel-Walking Mountain), 353 F.3d 792, 809 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(finding “[t]hese two mutually exclusive forms of fair use are equally applicable” to the 
photographer’s use of the BARBIE doll trade dress in “Food Chain Barbie”). 
 60 See, e.g., Audi AG v. D’Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 547 (6th Cir. 2006) (defendant 
“asserts a defense of fair use, which means that he used the mark for a purpose other than 
that for which the mark is typically used”). 
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every theory that might succeed.  When the same activity could be 
covered by a profusion of narrowly-drawn exceptions, 
harmonization merits serious consideration.  Whatever the other 
shortcomings of copyright fair use, at least the single codified 
defense informs all parties (and judges) which doctrine controls. 
Second, the various “fair use” doctrines themselves are, to put 
it simply, squishy.  Even the doctrines that present multi-prong 
tests leave great latitude for interpretation: how is the court to 
determine the requirements of descriptiveness or good faith under 
§ 33(b)(4)?61  Or whether the defendant meets the conditions under 
Judge Kozinski’s New Kids test for nominative use that “[f]irst, the 
product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable 
without use of the trademark [and] second, only so much of the 
mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify 
the product or service?”62  Worst of all are the totally unstructured 
principles in the First Amendment balancing cases, as noted 
earlier. 
Further squishiness arises because, on closer examination, 
many of the doctrines tend to collapse into likelihood of confusion 
inquiries with all the attendant vagueness.  The terms of § 33(b)(4) 
require that the defendant’s use be “otherwise than as a mark.”63  
This sounds like a restatement of the likelihood of confusion 
question.64  Likewise, nominative use cases often boil down to the 
requirement that the use involve “nothing that would, in 
conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by 
the trademark holder.”65  This, too, can be viewed as a highly 
factual question about the subjective confusion of consumers.  
Defendants may find it even more difficult to prevail under these 
 
 61 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000). 
 62 New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc, 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992).  
For some reasonably thoughtful analysis of these two factors, but with some confusion 
about which factor applies to the facts at hand, see Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 
F.3d 796, 804 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 63 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4). 
 64 See, e.g., Whirlpool Props., Inc. v. LG Elecs. Inc., No. 1:03-cv-414, 2005 WL 
3088339, *20–21 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 17, 2005) (“The first issue is whether defendant 
used the term descriptively and not as a trademark.  These questions are really two sides 
of the same coin.”). 
 65 New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308. 
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poorly theorized substitute standards than under the traditional test, 
especially because there are fewer precedents to guide 
interpretation than would be available for the established 
likelihood of confusion standards.66  In both instances, the key 
factor in the test really does little but restate likelihood of 
confusion. 
Third and finally, different jurisdictions recognize different 
combinations and variations of these doctrines.  While at least 
three circuits have adopted a nominative use doctrine,67 others 
have declined the opportunity to do so.68  The Second Circuit now 
structures its First Amendment analysis as a balancing test between 
confusion and speech,69 but other courts citing the Second Circuit’s 
Rogers v. Grimaldi precedent deploy it as a complete defense 
rather than as a countervailing factor against confusion.70  These 
variations are especially nettlesome because the different circuits 
all adhere to their own interpretations of federal trademark law and 
because it can sometimes be difficult to predict where trademark 
cases involving mass communication technology, including the 
internet, can be brought if there are the requisite contacts for 
jurisdiction in many states.71 
To be sure, predictability and clarity are matters of degree.  
The goal must be improvement, not perfection.  Nonetheless, 
trademark law should allow a reasonable advance judgment about 
the standards a court will apply to a particular case.  At the 
moment this goal is nowhere close to satisfied. 
 
 66 See Doellinger, supra note 53, at ¶ 1. 
 67 See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2005); 
Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 545–47 (5th Cir. 1998); New Kids on 
the Block, 971 F.2d at 308. 
 68 See Universal Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 424 (1st Cir. 2007); 
PACCAR Inc. v. Telescan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 69 Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379–80 (2d Cir. 
1993). 
 70 E.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. (Mattel-MCA), 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002); 
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 927–28 (6th Cir. 2003); E.S.S. Entm’t 
2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (C.D. Cal. 2006), appeal 
docketed, No. 06-56237 (Sept. 8, 2006). 
 71 Cf. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 
(1984); Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002). 
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D. Faster and Less Expensive Adjudication 
Returning to the vantage point of a speaker confronting the 
threat of a trademark lawsuit, the length and expense of litigation 
may well be the most important consideration.  The prospect of a 
protracted court fight that drains resources and demands time and 
energy will dissuade many an author or critic from mounting a 
defense.  According to a wide-ranging survey conducted by the 
American Intellectual Property Law Association, the estimated 
total median cost of the lowest-stakes category of trademark 
infringement litigation in 2006 was just over a quarter of a million 
dollars; in larger cases with more than a million dollars “at risk,” 
that figure rose to $650,000.72  If we are to reduce the chilling 
effect, faster and cheaper litigation must be a goal. 
Cost is especially important because many cease-and-desist 
letters from well-financed markholders target isolated individuals 
using trademarks expressively.73  Even those with somewhat more 
resources than a pajama-clad blogger still may have higher 
priorities than preserving the supposedly infringing use of a 
trademark: authors want to write books, political candidates want 
to win elections, and movie moguls want to go to parties.  Further 
increasing the asymmetry, the contested trademark may represent 
the lifeblood of a brand manager zealously guarding a trademark 
portfolio, but may constitute only a part of the overall message the 
defendant wished to convey. 
 
 72 AM. I.P. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 25 (2007). 
 73 See, e.g., BOLLIER, supra note 4, at 100 (“Most small-time parodists immediately 
fold when a large company accuses them of a trademark violation.  Who can afford the 
legal fees? . . . Typically, the inequality of economic power between corporation and 
parodist tends to determine who prevails in trademark infringment lawsuits.”); Lia Miller, 
Cosby’s Lawyers See No Flattery in an Imitation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2006, at C9 
(quoting web satirist who received cease-and-desist letter as saying: “Well-funded media, 
offline media, they are able to do this. . . . [W]hen you are a small independent artist, 
even when you know you are legally right, someone with money can strong-arm you into 
bending.”); Sean Higgins, Lake-O-Be-Gone, National Review Online (Sept. 28, 2005), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/higgins200509280816.asp (reporting that 
recipient of cease-and-desist letter is “not eager to test” potential fair use defense and 
instead complied with letter); see also MCLEOD, supra note 4, at 184–85, 212–14 
(discussing responsiveness of intermediaries such as movie studios and internet service 
providers to litigation threats); Gibson, supra note 7, at 913 (same). 
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Usually, then, recipients of cease-and-desist demands 
capitulate.  The few stories of those who do not give up are 
instructive.  Tom Forsythe, an art photographer, confronted 
Mattel’s objection to his series of works entitled “Food Chain 
Barbie,” which “portray a nude Barbie in danger of being attacked 
by vintage household appliances.”74  He spent five months 
searching for legal representation and reports that a “long list of 
attorneys suggested I just give up, since I hadn’t made any money 
anyway.”75  The ACLU finally agreed to represent him and 
enlisted a large California law firm to handle the case pro bono.76  
The overall defense costs for the litigation, which included closely-
integrated trademark and copyright claims, eventually topped two 
million dollars.77 
Litigating the likelihood of confusion question is a long, fact-
intensive, and expensive process.  It often involves the use of 
survey evidence, which runs up the bill quickly.  Courts consider 
its highly-factual nature frequently inappropriate for summary 
judgment.78  As noted above, numerous free speech cases turn on 
the analysis of this arduous test. 
Worse, some judges combine the distinct doctrines aimed at 
protecting speech interests with the likelihood of confusion 
inquiry, resulting in an even longer analysis.  Courts in the Second 
Circuit usually combine a full likelihood of confusion test with 
special Rogers v. Grimaldi considerations related to free 
 
 74 Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods. (Mattel-Walking Mountain), 353 F.3d 792, 
796 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 75 Tom Forsythe, Artsurdism, www.tomforsythe.com/bio_foodchain.cfm (last visited 
Feb. 29, 2008). 
 76 Id. 
 77 See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Expenses, Mattel-
Walking Mountain, No. CV99-85432RSWL(RZX), 2004 WL 1454100 (C.D. Cal. June 
21, 2004) (awarding defendant $1,584,089 in legal fees and $241,797.09 in costs); 
Forsythe, supra note 75 (stating that appeals fees and costs of approximately $300,000 
added to trial court figures for at total of $2.1 million total in fees and costs).  Fee-
shifting such as occurred in the “Food Chain Barbie” case is relatively unusual in 
trademark law, where only “exceptional cases” justify such awards. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) 
(2000). 
 78 See Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1265 (9th Cir. 2001); 
Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 637 (7th Cir. 2001); 3 MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS, supra note 12, at § 32:120–21 (collecting cases showing presumption 
against summary judgment). 
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expression.79  The Ninth Circuit, even after the Supreme Court 
held in KP Permanent that the presence of confusion did not 
foreclose the § 33(b)(4) defense for descriptive uses, nevertheless 
remanded that case to the district court to conduct the full 
likelihood of confusion review, just in case it might shed light on 
the § 33(b)(4) analysis.80  The Third Circuit adopted the 
nominative fair use test, but mandated that a court must always 
first conduct a modified (but not really simplified) likelihood of 
confusion analysis.81 
Even without combining the doctrines, routine judicial 
management decisions can have the same prolonging effect.  If a 
court defers all summary judgment motions and hears them 
together at the end of a fixed discovery period, then both sides 
must marshal the evidence and arguments to support their view of 
likelihood of confusion, regardless of any affirmative defenses that 
might have disposed of the case more simply and with less 
discovery.  Similar results follow if a court simultaneously 
considers all matters related to a motion for preliminary injunction, 
often decided after extensive discovery. 
Finally, aside from the sequence in which courts consider 
issues, the unclear standards explored in Section C magnify the 
expense and length of court fights.  Fighting on multiple doctrinal 
fronts requires more pricey lawyer time.  Dealing with unclear and 
fact-intensive standards likewise presents more difficult, and 
therefore more expensive, legal tasks.  (Similar delay arises where 
the inquiry collapses into likelihood of confusion, since the 
defendant must offer much of the same evidence for both 
likelihood of confusion and these other doctrines anyway and may 
 
 79 See, e.g., Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379–80 (2d 
Cir. 1993); Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 330, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000). 
 80 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc. (KP Permanent II), 408 
F.3d 596, 607–09 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 81 Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 222 (3d Cir. 2005).  
Ironically, the court said it adopted this structure to help defendants, because it kept the 
initial burden of proof on plaintiffs. Id. at 223, 232.  This may be true in a formal sense, 
but most defendants in these cases would prefer to carry that burden on a quick and 
simple defense rather than endure a lengthy discovery process to adjudicate plaintiff’s 
burden on likelihood of confusion first. 
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end up arguing over fundamentally similar standards.)  Addressing 
the interrelated problems of legal clarity and predictability should, 
in turn, help speed adjudication and keep down costs.  Addressing 
one goal advances the other one too. 
In practical terms, if the legal defenses available for speech 
require substantial investment by speakers, a chilling effect will 
result.  Yet just a little more attention to the structural features of 
those defenses could bring us much closer to the goal of speedy 
adjudication.  This change may do more than any other to 
empower speech that uses trademarks. 
E. Summary of Free Speech Goals 
Only one of the four goals I have discussed animates current 
law.  That is the goal related to substantive legal issues: the 
balance between competing values of source identification and free 
expression.  This goal should remain paramount, but not to the 
exclusion of the others.  Constitutional avoidance has deteriorated 
in recent years as open-ended First Amendment reasoning became 
more common.  The two more procedural goals have also been 
neglected.  Procedural changes will do more to protect speech than 
would complete renovation of the substantive rules. 
It may fairly be argued that confusing legal standards or 
inequality of power are endemic problems in many areas of the law 
and are no worse here.  I would disagree with this comparative 
assessment.  But more fundamentally, even if this characterization 
is right, it does not mean that we should settle for the current state 
of affairs and its speech-suppressing consequences.  Rather, 
trademark doctrine should aim to satisfy all four of the free speech 
goals discussed here.  If we started from scratch today to design 
the law of trademark fair use, we should begin with these four 
goals and pay special attention to doctrinal structure. 
II. 
Turning goals into doctrines is the tough part.  Nevertheless, 
more attention to the full range of free speech goals—not merely 
trying to reach the correctly balanced result—should help us see 
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the big picture.  And from that, we can learn some lessons that will 
be useful in the next stage of this project.82  This Essay is not the 
place to finish the job, but I can suggest some starting points. 
First of all, the above analysis leads to the conclusion that we 
should uncouple trademark fair use doctrines as much as possible 
from the canonical likelihood of confusion test.  Let me be sure to 
emphasize that the balance between source identification and 
confusion remains crucial—goal number one, in fact.  But striking 
that balance doctrinally through the likelihood of confusion 
standard (or other standards that reduce to much the same thing) 
often causes too much obscurity and delay.  Likelihood of 
confusion reasoning satisfies the first goal but directly thwarts the 
third and fourth.  If the structure of a doctrine systematically chills 
the very speech it aims to protect, then it must be reconsidered.  
While the hard cases may reach the likelihood of confusion stage, 
it should be a final hurdle for borderline fact patterns, not the first 
line of defense for free speech. 
Some courts and commentators are moving toward a different 
doctrinal solution based on explicit First Amendment balancing.  
This approach has some potential advantages over likelihood of 
confusion reasoning (although as I’ve pointed out, it is often used 
in conjunction with that reasoning anyhow).  But it also fails to 
satisfy the four goals outlined here.  The Rogers v. Grimaldi test83 
and all its variants engage in problematic and unnecessary 
constitutional decision-making.  Their reliance on ethereal 
standards make the predictability and clarity of the law even 
worse.  So, on at least two of the four goals enunciated here, the 
newly popular First Amendment doctrine moves backwards. 
So, what would be better?  Ideally, we would structure our new 
doctrine so that the defendant could invoke it earlier in litigation 
with less need for factually-based determinations and the resulting 
discovery and experts.  This ideal defense would function as a 
“gatekeeper” that could efficiently screen out legitimate expressive 
uses of trademarks whose communicative value likely outweighed 
 
82 See William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2008). 
 83 875 F.2d 994, 997–1000 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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any source identification value at stake.84  A clearly applicable 
affirmative defense would also serve as a powerful shield against 
cease-and-desist demands from markholders.  A response that 
advances such a crisp doctrine, rather than citing in the alternative 
to a series of amorphous precedents, could end the dispute without 
litigation, but this time in the defendant’s favor. 
How should such defenses work?  I think there is promise in 
the development of some categorical safe harbors.  The best 
example of this approach in current trademark doctrine is the 
relatively new set of statutory carve-outs from liability under 
federal dilution law (which do not apply to infringement cases).85  
The original carve-outs, which were part of the federal dilution 
statue enacted in 1995, applied to noncommercial uses, 
comparative advertising, and news reporting or commentary.86  We 
could select certain types of repeat situations in which trademark 
disputes with free speech implications arise, and simply remove 
them from consideration.  As Robert Bone has documented, 
trademark law already relies on many such general rules to 
“simplify the inquiry” in response to high enforcement costs, 
including the administrative costs of adjudicating an issue.87  A 
few marginal cases involving some confusion might escape 
liability this way, but perhaps we would decide, as we have in 
other aspects of trademark law, to tolerate a small amount of 
confusion in exchange for other values. 
I am not yet prepared to support particular examples of such 
rules, but let me nominate a few possibilities to illustrate the point.  
Perhaps we should consider exemptions for: 
 
 84 Cf. Dogan & Lemley, Search Costs, supra note 9, at 805 (arguing for same role for 
trademark use requirement). 
 85 Trademark Dilution Revision Act, Pub. L. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006). 
 86 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996).  
Unfortunately, in 2006 Congress amended the statue in a manner that severely reduced its 
clarity. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2000), amended by The Trademark Dilution Revision 
Act of 2006.  The provision I am discussing in text is the old version; the new version 
may have some of these advantages but will lack others. 
 87 Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 
2101–02 (2004). 
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• “[N]ews reporting and news commentary,” an 
exception already found in the federal dilution statute 
that could be extended to infringement cases; 
• Uses within political campaigns, adapting a statutory 
exemption in California’s right of publicity statute;88 
• Incidental use of a trademark within a work of fiction; 
• Evaluations of products such as reviews and rankings 
aimed at informing consumers; and 
• Negative commentary, on the theory that the likelihood 
of confusion is inherently lower and the dangers of 
markholder control especially high. 
While such blanket exemptions make the simplest rules, in 
trickier cases we could also develop rebuttable presumptions, 
burden-shifting, or, at least, affirmative defenses that a defendant 
could raise immediately upon assembling the necessary evidence.  
These might be necessary where it proves difficult to define a 
category, but nonetheless we can generate a list of characteristics 
that should lead to immunization.  Existing defenses such as 
§ 33(b)(4) presumably would continue to exist and might be 
invoked for cases that were not screened out by these other 
mechanisms.  Finally, the most complicated cases would make it 
all the way through to the likelihood of confusion analysis.  Their 
numbers would be fewer, however, and they would involve the sort 
of closer calls that justify the lengthier examination of all the 
circumstances. 
The outlines of this structure already represent an improvement 
over current doctrine in meeting all four free speech goals for 
trademark law.  (Clearly, the details need a good deal of thought.)  
As a matter of substance, these types of suggestions would balance 
the goals of source identification and protection for free 
expression.  They also internalize First Amendment imperatives in 
a manner similar to copyright law, rather than indulging courts’ 
taste for ad hoc constitutional decision-making.  At the same time, 
 
 88 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(d) (2006).  Granted, the examples I cited above about 
“Problem Pregnancy” and the “REP Party” lead to challenges here, but they can be 
addressed through appropriate general limitations on the defense. See supra notes 16–19 
and accompanying text. 
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doctrines of this sort offer a lot more to our imagined speaker 
considering the unlicensed use of a trademark or facing a threat of 
infringement litigation over a use already made. 
CONCLUSION 
A browse through decided cases on Westlaw might suggest 
that all is well with free speech in trademark law.  Such 
complacence would be wrong.  Getting the correct substantive 
result may provide some tidy academic satisfaction, but it is only 
supposed to be the instrumental means to a larger end.  Right now, 
that larger end is thwarted by the structure of trademark law, which 
pervasively chills expression without sufficient benefit in 
preventing confusion. 
It is time to rethink the law of trademark fair use so that it 
achieves all four free speech goals outlined here.  Those goals 
include balancing the policy objectives of trademark law with free 
speech and integrating the commands of the First Amendment into 
trademark doctrine.  More fundamentally, clearer rules and faster 
adjudication will increase the chances that expression using 
trademarks becomes and remains available to our shared discourse.  
In the end, that is really the only free speech goal.  Until such 
reform, for every happy ending in the law books like Freecycle, 
there will be uncounted other individual decisions to forego or 
withdraw speech, robbing us of its contributions. 
